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ABSTRACT
The Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control
by Damien J. Neven and Lars-Hendrik Röller*
In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control
agencies which assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of
merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both
explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to
occur when economic integration is high. Hence, “globalisation” should alleviate rather
than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise
between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very
strict) towards dominance.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Konfliktmöglichkeiten bei internationaler Fusionskontrolle
In diesem Beitrag werden die Konfliktpotentiale zwischen Kartellbehörden untersucht.
Die Analyse basiert auf einem positiven Ansatz der Fusionskontrolle, in dem die
Kartellbehörde explizit modelliert wird. Es zeigt sich, daß Konflikte bei der
internationalen Fusionskontrolle weniger wahrscheinlich sind, wenn Unternehmen auf
integrierten Märkten konkurrieren. In diesem Sinne führt eine „Globalisierung“ der
Weltwirtschaft zu einer Reduzierung des Konfliktpotentials zwischen
Wettbewerbsbehörden.
                                               
*
 We would like to thank Petros Mavroidis for insightful comments on a previous version of this
paper..
1 Introduction
A number of high proÞle cases, like Aerospoatiale/de Havilland, Boeing/Mc Donnell-
Douglas or Gencor/Lonrho have recently underlined potential conßicts between coun-
tries in the implementation of antitrust rules. Antitrust authorities have responded to
the situation by entering into or upgrading bi-lateral co-operation agreements which are
meant to reduce the scope for conßict by sharing information and providing incentive for
building consensus1. Still, these arrangements are now regarded as insuﬃcient by both
the US and European antitrust authorities. According to the (former) U.S. Assistant
Attorney General Joel Klein (2000), the advance of globalisation in the years to come
will only enhance the scope for conßict and further integration of antitrust proceedings
across jurisdictions will be necessary. Similar conjectures have been put forward by the
EU Antitrust authorities which in the words of its Director General for Competition
favours various new initiatives including a multilateral or bilateral arbitration mecha-
nism which would allow ...to go beyond the necessity for each competition authority to
take primarily into account the consumer interests in its territory (Schaub, 1998).
As emphasised by Bacchetta et al. (1998), the presumption that the scope for
conßict is (quantitatively) important and likely to increase further is hardly supported
by a formal analysis. This paper, as well as a companion paper (Neven and Röller
(2000a) attempt to provide the rudiments of such analysis. In the companion paper,
we Þrst noted that the scope for scope for conßict should in principle be aﬀected by the
rules governing the assertion of jurisdictions. We observed that most jurisdictions now
adhere to the so called eﬀects principle such that any country will assert jurisdiction
when its interest is aﬀected (whether consumers interest, Þrms interest or both)2. This
paper also concluded, using a formal analysis of merger control, that the allocation of
jurisdiction matters surprisingly little for the outcome of merger control. That is,
we found that the circumstances where delegation to a single centralised authority or
devolution to a single national authority would lead to a diﬀerent outcome from the
simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction may not be that frequent.
This paper focuses on a positive analysis of conßict. We assume, in line which
current practice, that all countries aﬀected by a merger will assert jurisdiction, and
that each country has eﬀectively a veto power on any proposed merger. We specify a
simple model of merger control which accounts for the essential features of the procedure
followed by the main antitrust agencies. In particular, we explicitly model both the
decision taken by the agencies on market deÞnition and their analysis of dominance.
We assume that the objective of antitrust authorities is to defend consumers inter-
1See for instance Montini (1998)
2See Mavroidis and Neven (1999) for a discussion of this issue.
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ests. This assumption is a fair description of the objective which is currently assigned
to both US and EU agencies in charge of merger control. For instance, Art. 2 of the
merger regulation stipulates that the merger task force should be solely concerned about
restrictions of competition and that eﬃciency beneÞts should only be taken into account
in so far as consumers are not hurt. Hence, it would appear that the merger regulation
is concerned about consumer surplus. The US antitrust legislation has a similar focus
on consumers (see e.g. Gellhorn and Kovacic, 1994). Such a narrow objective can also
be rationalised in the presence of regulatory failures3.
In this context, we characterise both the scope and the type of conßict that may
arise, for a given distribution of mergers in terms of their sales across countries.
We Þnd that whenever national antitrust agencies deÞne the global market as rele-
vant, no conßict can ever emerge. In addition, we observe that a positive correlation of
market shares for the merged entity across jurisdictions reduces the potential for conßict.
These two observations certainly suggest that globalization, rather than exacerbate,
may actually alleviate conßict. In addition, we Þnd that conßict is less likely to arise
between countries of diﬀerent size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very
strict treshholds) towards dominance.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The scope for
conßict is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Merger Control
Consider a two-country model4 with countries, i = 1, 2 and a homogenous commodity.
Denote N as the proportion of consumers located in country 1 (with 1 − N located
in country 2), with N > 1
2
, so that country one can be seen as the  large country.
Each consumer is endowed with a downward sloping demand curve for the homogenous
good which is written q(P ). Consumers can buy from either country. If prices in
the two countries are identical, all consumers will choose to buy in their own country5.
3See for instance Besanko and Spulber (1993) or Neven and Röller (2000b)
4The framework considered here diﬀers from the usual model of international trade and economic
integration where markets are segmented. In such models, consumers buy only in their domestic country
(either from a domestic supplier or imports) and there is no room for demand substitution across
markets. In this sense, the standard model of economic integration is not consistent with the approach
used by antitrust authorities in the assessment of the relevant market. What is required in order to make
these approaches consistent is an explicit model of consumer choice across countries (like an arbitrage
constraint). A critique of the traditional approach in international trade, as well as an alternative
model, can be found in Horn et al. (1994).
5This is eﬀectively what deÞnes a country in this model.
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Consumers will switch as a function of relative prices. Denote n(P1, P2) as the proportion
of consumers buying in country 1 with,
∂n
∂P1
= − ∂n
∂P2
= a < 0 (1)
That is, consumers will respond to price diﬀerences and the higher is the price dif-
ference, the higher is the proportion of consumers buying from the country where the
price is lower. The rate at which consumers switch across markets is also independent
of the price level. The demand in markets 1 and 2 can then be written as,
q1 = n(P1, P2)q(P1) (2)
q2 = (1− n(P1, P2))q(P2)
At this point, it is worth mentioning that the above reduced form demand model
encompasses several speciÞcations. For instance, it would include a spatial model where
consumers select a place of purchase according to delivered prices. It would also include a
model where consumers bear a cost of switching across markets and where the switching
cost varies across consumers6.
In terms of equilibrium prices, we will assume that Þrms can produce and sell in
both countries. For our purposes, we do not need to specify the competitive interactions
between Þrms, but simply assume that there is a pair of equilibrium price  one for each
country - before the merger takes place which is denoted (PE1 , P
E
2 ). We also assume
that there is a competitive price which is identical for both markets and is denoted by
P c.
We will now specify the actions of the antitrust agency in each country. Assume that
there is a merger task force in each country which evaluates mergers by Þrst delineating
the relevant market and subsequently deciding to allow or ban the merger on the basis
of the market share of the merging parties in the relevant market.
Market DeÞnition: In terms of deÞning the relevant market, the agency uses the
so-called SSNIP test  i.e. asks whether a hypothetical monopolist could increase price
proÞtably by x % above the competitive level. The extent to which a hypothetical
proÞt maximising monopolist would increase price by x % is inversely proportional to
the elasticity of demand. Hence, ignoring the diﬀerence between the proÞt maximising
increase in price and a proÞtable increase in price, the relevant market can be determined
by the elasticity of demand. The agency will thus consider market i as the relevant
6See for instance the model of Klemperer (1987).
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market for the sake of antitrust analysis, if the elasticity of demand evaluated at the
competitive price, say εi, is below some benchmark, say K.
We therefore need to derive the elasticity of demand for the above model. Using (2)
the elasticity of demand ( εi ) faced by a monopolist at the competitive level P c can be
written as,
ε1 = −P c
·
∂q(P c)
∂P1
1
q(P c)
+
∂n(P c1 , P
E
2 )
∂P1
1
n(P c, PE2 )
¸
and
ε2 = −P c
·
∂q(P c)
∂P2
1
q(P c)
− ∂n(P
E
1 , P
c
2 )
∂P2
1
(1− n(PE1 , P c))
¸
The elasticity of demand in market 1 will thus be lower than the elasticity faced in
market 2 as long as,
n(P c, PE2 ) > (1− n(PE1 , P c))
which implies by (1) that
N + a(PE2 − P c) > (1−N) + a(PE1 − P c) (3)
Note that (3) holds for large enough N. As we argued above, we assume that country
1 is the larger country. Consequently, we will assume that N is large enough such that
(3) holds, which implies that,
ε1 < ε2
Note that when equilibrium prices are identical in the two countries (3) holds for any
N > 1/2.
It is important to note that in this framework diﬀerent antitrust authorities could
take diﬀerent views on the relevant market. In particular, when ε1 < K < ε2, the
antitrust authority in the large market will decide that its own jurisdiction is a relevant
market, whereas the antitrust authority in market 2 will decide that its own jurisdiction
is too small (a hypothetical monopolist would not be able to proÞtably raise price) and
hence will consider the combination of the two markets as the relevant market for the
analysis of dominance.
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As we will see below, an important parameter will be the relative size of the two
countries. Denote s as the share of demand in country 1 relative to total demand, where
demand is estimated at the equilibrium level7. Thus,
s =
q1(P
E
1 , P
E
2 )
q1(PE1 , P
E
2 ) + q2(P
E
1 , P
E
2 )
Assessment of Dominance: With respect to the analysis of dominance, we assume
the simplest possible rule namely that if the market share in the relevant market of the
merging parties is higher than B (the threshold), the merger is banned. Otherwise,
it is allowed. In other words, a larger B corresponds to a softer standard. Denote
the market share of a proposed merger in country i by MSi. Using our deÞnition of
s,the market share of the proposed merger in the combined two-country market is then,
MSt = sMS1+(1−s)MS2.Which market share is used in the assessment of dominance
will depend on the market which is considered relevant.
In terms of outcome, we will assume that there is simultaneous assertion of juris-
diction with eﬀective veto power. In other words a merger is blocked if and only if at
least one of the national agency decides to block the merger8. As a result there will be
conßict between agencies whenever one agency blocks the merger, while others would
have allowed the merger.
3 Analysis of Conflict
We are now ready to analyze the emergence of conßict. Recall that each jurisdiction has
veto power in the sense that it can block the merger independently of what the other
agency decides. We assume that when a merger is banned by a particular jurisdiction,
it cannot take place in a reduced form in another jurisdiction. That is, we neglect
the possibility of having partial deals or remedies for particular jurisdictions. This
assumption tends to reinforce the importance of external eﬀects across jurisdictions and
the prospect for conßicts.
In particular, we will analyze under what circumstances one country would like to
allow the merger, while the other blocks it. In principle, there are two possibilities: Þrst,
the merger is blocked by country 2 (the smaller country), even though country 1 (the
7In principle, it it possible that s < 1/2, even when N is such that (3) holds. This might occur
when equilibrium prices are very small in the small country. In what follows, we will exclude this case
and assume that s ≥ 1/2.
8There are no side payments.
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larger country) would allow the merger. Second, the merger is blocked by country 1,
even though country 2 Þnds the merger beneÞcial.
The analysis of conßict can be structured into three cases.
3.1 Global Markets
The Þrst case emerges whenever ε1 > K. In this scenario, a competition authority in
market 1 (the large market) will conclude that the relevant market is the combination
of both markets. Given that ε1 ≤ ε2, the competition authority in the small country
will reach the same conclusion. As a consequence, both authorities will consider MSt in
the analysis of dominance and we have the following remark.
Remark 1 If ε1 > K, then there is no conßict.
Therefore, it appears that contrary to received wisdom,  global industries are not
those where the conßict between jurisdiction should arise. The intuition behind this
observation is that any subset of a relevant market is, from a competition point of view,
a reduced scale version of the broader market. The fact that conßicts actually often arise
in such industries can then be associated with the pursuit of objectives that antitrust
authorities are not supposed to pursue.
3.2 National Markets
The second case is when ε2 < K. According to the behavior of the agencies, both
authorities recognize that each country is a separate relevant market and take a decision
on the basis of dominance in its own national market. Therefore, conßict will arise
whenever one agency blocks the merger while the other allows it, i.e. when MS2 > B >
MS1 orMS2 < B < MS1. In order to analyze the probability of conßict, we proceed by
specifying the distribution of market shares. In other words, we assume that the rules
of the agency are Þxed (i.e. market deÞnition through K and the threshold through B),
while the market shares vary across the proposed merger cases.
Let us assume that the market shares in each country are identically and inde-
pendently distributed in the [0, 1] interval with a cumulative density of F (MSi). The
independence assumption might not be realistic but serves as a useful benchmark. We
will return to this point below. DeÞne P1 as the probability that the merger would
be allowed by country 1, but banned by country 2, conditional on ε2 < K. Similarly,
the conditional probability that country 1 would ban the merger when country 2 would
allow it is denoted as P2. Given that P1 and P2 are mutually exclusive, the probability
of either conßict emerging is P1 + P2. Using this, we have the following simple Lemma.
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Lemma 1 When market shares are independent, P1 = P2. The probability of conßict is
concave in the threshold B and achieves a maximum at F (B) = 0.5.
Proof: The conditional probability of conßict P1is deÞned as P1 ≡ P (MS2 > B >
MS1 p ε2 < K). Given the independence of market shares across markets and given
that the market deÞnition is independent of the market shares, we can write P1 =
F (B)(1 − F (B)). Similarly, P2 ≡ P (MS2 < B < MS1 p ε2 < K) which is equal to
P1 under the maintained assumptions. Thus, both P1 and P1 are concave in B and
achieve a maximum at F (B) = 0.5. Given that P1 and P2 are mutually exclusive, the
joint probability of either conßict emerging is P1 + P2, which is also concave in B and
achieves a maximum at F (B) = 0.5.¥
Note that both the individual as well as the joint probabilities of conßict are concave
in B, achieving their maximum at the same threshold level. We therefore have the
following remark.
Remark 2 When relevant markets are national, both lenient and strict merger thresh-
olds lead to lower conßicts. Country size does not matter.
The remark indicates that either strict or soft merger control (in terms of thresholds)
lowers conßict. Interestingly, this also implies that conßicts are less likely to arise when
eﬃciency beneÞts are taken into account. The reason is simply that an evaluation of
mergers which consider eﬃciencies will apply diﬀerent dominance benchmarks depending
on the level of eﬃciency beneÞts accruing to the merger. Higher eﬃciencies will be
associated with higher thresholds. Hence, any policy which considers eﬃciency will
consider more dispersed thresholds and will lead to less conßicts relative to a policy
which considers a unique threshold that reßects average eﬃciency gains9.
It is also worth pointing out that the relative diﬀerence in country size as measured
by s has no impact on the probability of either conßict. In this sense, countries are
indiﬀerent with whom they share simultaneous jurisdiction with veto power.
Another issue, which we have not addressed so far is the possibility of market shares
being correlated across countries. Given the deÞnition of P1and P2 above, it is clear
that a positive correlation in market shares across markets will lower the probability of
conßict. We therefore have the following remark.
Remark 3 When relevant markets are national, a positive (negative) correlation in
market shares across markets lowers (raises) the probability of conßict.
9For a procedure that takes eﬃciencies explicitely into account see Röller, Stennek, and Verboven
(2000).
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Whether market shares are positively or negatively correlated depends on the precise
characteristics of the merger. For instance, if Þrm size is associated with eﬃciencies and
if eﬃciencies are correlated across countries, one would expect in a Cournot like model
to observe a positive correlation in the distribution of Þrm size across countries. On the
other hand, in a model where Þrms suﬀer from a cost or demand disadvantage in selling
abroad, a negative correlation would emerge in the case of a merger between domestic
Þrms. However, an international merger would still produce a positive correlation.
In sum, one might argue that integrated economies will lead to market shares that
are positively correlated across countries. In that sense, a more integrated market should
also lower the probability of conßict between antitrust agencies.
3.3 Global Markets and National Markets
We now consider the last case, where there is a conßict over the deÞnition of the relevant
market such that the authority in market 1 considers its own market as relevant, whereas
the authority in market 2 considers the combination of the two markets as relevant. That
is, in this last case, ε1 < K < ε2.
As before there are two types of conßict. First, the probability that the merger would
be allowed by country 1 but banned by country 2, which is deÞned as P1 ≡ P (MSt >
B > MS1 p ε1 < K < ε2). Intuitively, this case will arise when the market share of the
merged entity in market 2 is  very large so that despite the small weight of country
2, the aggregate market share exceeds the threshold (even though the market share in
country 1 does not). Second, the probability that country 1 would ban the merger while
country 2 would allow it, which is deÞned as, P2 ≡ P (MSt < B < MS1 p ε1 < K < ε2).
This is consistent with very low market shares in country 2.
Given these deÞnitions, it is clear that the realisation of P1 will be associated with a
lowMS1 together with a highMS2. Analogously, the realisation of P2 will be associated
with a high MS1 and a low MS2 . Hence, given the deÞnition of P1, P2, and MS1 we
have the following remark.
Remark 4 When there is conßict over market deÞnition, a positive (negative) correla-
tion in market shares across markets lowers (raises) the probability of conßict.
Comparing this result with that in the previous section, we Þnd that a positive
correlation in market shares lowers the potential for conßict independently of the market
deÞnition. In that sense, a more integrated market should also lower the probability of
conßict between antitrust agencies.
In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we assume henceforth that the market shares
in each country are distributed uniformly in the [0, 1] interval and independently across
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countries. To calculate P1 it is convenient to refer to Figure 1a, which represents the
parameter range for which a conßict could arise. The market share of the combined
entity in market 1 and 2 are respectively on the horizontal and vertical axis. A merger
could be banned by country 2 and allowed by country one when MS1 < B and when
MS2 > B, i.e. in the top left hand area. However, only very  high values of MS2
can lead to MSt > B. Using the deÞnition of MSt , the market share constraint is
given by MS2 > B1−s − s1−sMS1,which is represented as the straight line originating at
the point (B,B). Only market shares above this line will lead to a conßict. Note that
whenever B > 1− s the constraint crosses the upper part of the box at MS∗1 given by
B = sMS∗1 + 1− s.
Calculation of the shaded area yields the probability of the Þrst type of conßict, that
is
P1 =
1− s
2s
(1−B)2 if B > 1− s
Analogously, whenever B < 1−s the market share constraint for which conßict could
arise crosses the left hand side of the box . However, in this case an additional constraint
on the emergence of conßict will be relevant. More precisely, the distribution of market
shares across markets needs to be consistent with the market deÞnition and thus with
the assumption that market 2 is not a relevant market. The fact that market 2 is too
small to be a relevant market implies that a Þrm with a 100 % market share would
not be able to exercise signiÞcant market power in that area. Of course this implies
that if the aggregate output of the merged entity in the broader market does not exceed
the output of this monopolist, it should not allow the merged entity to exercise market
power either. Hence, all joint values ofMS1 andMS2 which do not make up for the size
of market 2 would be inconsistent with the view that market 2 is not a relevant market.
This relevant market constraint can be expressed as MS2 +MS1 s1−s > 1, i.e. all
values above this constraint are consistent with market deÞnition. Note that when B <
1− s, the relevant market constraint is more binding than the market share constraint.
Hence, we only need to consider the market share constraint10. The relevant market
constrain is represented as the solid lines in Figure 1b, where MS∗2 = 1− Bs1−s . For the
case of B < 1−s the area of conßict is thus given by the area above the relevant market
constraint, which is given by
10Note that in the previous case of B > 1− s, the market share constraint is binding.
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P1 =
s
2(1− s)B
2 if B < 1− s
Let us now turn to the probability that country 1 would ban the merger when country
2 would allow it. This is deÞned as, P2 ≡ P (MSt < B < MS1 p ε1 < K < ε2). This
is consistent with very low market shares in country 2, i.e. the market share constraint
is given by MS2 < B1−s − s1−sMS1. As before, we need to distinguish two parameter
regions. When B < s, the market share constraint crosses the bottom of the box at the
point MS
0
1 given by B − sMS 01 = 0, which is represneted in Figure 2a.
Market shares below this line will lead to a conßict and we have that
P2 =
1− s
2s
B2 if B < s
Whenever B > s, the market share constraint crosses the right hand side of the box
at MS
0
2 = (B − s)/(1 − s)) (see Figure 2b) and the probability of conßict is given by
the area below the constraint, that is,
P2 =
2B(1−B)− s(1−B2)
2(1− s) if B > s
The magnitude of the two types of conßict probabilities can be characterised as
follows.
Lemma 2 P2 > P1 if and only if B > 1/2.
Proof: We Þrst show that B > 1/2 ⇒ P2 > P1. Let B > 1/2 which implies that
B > 1− s since s > 1/2. We therefore have that P1 = 1−s2s (1−B)2. Consider the region
where B < s, such that P2 = 1−s2s B
2. We have that P2 > P1 since B > 1/2. Consider
the region where B > s, such that P2 =
2B(1−B)−s(1−B2)
2(1−s) . Using these expressions it can
be shown that P2 > P1 if and only if s 1−s1−B > 1/2, which is satisÞed for B > s.
We now show that B < 1/2 ⇒ P2 < P1. Since B < 1/2,we must have that B <
s,which implies that P2 = 1−s2s B
2. Consider the region where B < 1 − s, for which
P1 =
1−s
2s
(1 − B)2. Comparing yields that P2 < P1 since B < 1/2. Finally, consider
the region where B > 1− s, for which P1 = s2(1−s)B2. Comparing yields that P2 < P1
whenever 1−s
s
< s
1−s , which is satisÞed since s > 1/2.¥
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The Lemma shows that the smaller country (country 2) is more likely to get vetoed
than the larger country (country 1) when the thresholds are high, i.e. when the merger
standard is soft and vice-versa. The intuition is as follows: assume that the standard
is stringent (B is low) and that the merger is allowed by the large country; the values
of the market share in the large country for which this occurs are thus relatively small
and for each one of them, there is still a wide range of the distribution of the market
share in the small country which will ensure that the overall market share (a weighted
average) falls above the threshold. By contrast, if the merger is banned by the large
country, the range of market shares in the large country for which this occurs includes
relatively large values of market shares. For any single one of them, the range of market
shares in the small country that will ßip the overall market share on the other side of
the threshold will be relatively small. Hence, the former event is more likely than the
latter.
The same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis for a lax standard (B is high). Assume
that the merger is banned by the large country. This arise for relatively high values of
the market shares and for each one of them, there is a wide range of the distribution of
the market share in the small country which will ensure that the overall market share
fall below the threshold. By contrast, if the merger is allowed in the large country, the
range of market shares in the large country for which this occurs will include relatively
low values. For any single one of them, the range of market share in the small country
which will ßip the overall market share on the other side of the threshold will be relatively
limited. This later event is thus less likely than the former.
Using the above expressions for the probability of conßict we can now derive the
comparative statics with respect to s and B of the probabilities of conßict, which are
given in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 (i) ∂P1
∂s
≤ 0 and ∂P1
∂B
≤ 0 if and only if B ≥ 1− s
(ii) ∂P2
∂s
≤ 0
(iii) ∂P2
∂B
≥ 0 if and only if B ≤ 1
2−s
Figure 3a summarizes the previous two lemmas with respect to s for the case where
B > 1/2. As can be seen, both veto probabilities are declining in s. This implies that
both countries are less aﬀected by simultaneous jurisdiction whenever the countries are
of very unequal size. On the other hand, the more similar in size the countries are, the
higher the probability of conßict.
Figure 3b allows for B < 1/2. As can be seen, the probability that the larger country
gets vetoed by the smaller country is now concave in s with a left minimum at s = 1/2.
In other words, for 1/2 < s < 1 − B, the veto probability of the larger countriy is
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increasing in s, which implies that for this range the larger country increases its veto
probability the more unequal the countries are. Nevertheless, the veto probability P1 is
clearly lowest for a suﬃcient large s. More precisely, let the critical value s be deÞned
as P1(s = 1/2) ≡ P1(s), which implies that s = (1 − B)2/(B2 + (1 − B)2). Then, any
s > s will ensure lower P1, and P1 continues to fall for higher s (see Figure 3b). The
following remark summarizes these Þndings.
Remark 5 When there is conßict over market deÞnition, countries of unequal size have
more of an incentive to integrate their competition policy through simultaneous jurisdic-
tion with veto power than countries of similar size.
Figure 4 summarizes the results with regard to the threshold B. As one can see,
both conßict probabilities are concave. We Þnd that for relatively strict merger policies
(B < 1 − s), both conßict probabilities are rising in B, while for relatively soft merger
policies (B > 1/(2 − s)) both are falling. Moreover, there is an intermediate region
(1− s < B < 1/(2− s)) where the impact of B is diﬀerent across the types of conßicts.
Nevertheless, we have the following remark.
Remark 6 When there is conßict over market deÞnition, both lenient and strict merger
thresholds lead to the lowest probabilities of conßict.
A related question is to ask under what circumstances any type of conßict arises, i.e.
P1 + P2. For the region of 1− s < B < s we have that P1 + P2 = 1−s2s ((1 − B)2 + B2),
which is u-shaped in B with a minimum at B = 1/2. Overall, P1+P2 is thus not concave
and it has a local minimum at B = 1/2. In fact, this local minimum also arises when
the probabilities are identical, i.e. P1 = P2.
In sum, the results of this section indicate that conßict is less likely to emerge when
national antitrust agencies deÞne the global market as relevant and when there is a
positive correlation across jurisdictions in market shares. In addition, when the relevant
market is not perceived not global by both countries, the threshold matters and either
low or high thresholds reduce the scope for conßict. Finally, the diﬀerence in country
size matters only when there is conßict over the relevant market, i.e. when one country
deÞnes the global market as relevant while the other country considers the national
market as relevant. In those circumstances we Þnd that countries of unequal size have
lower probabilities of conßict.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we address the issue of conßict that might arise between antitrust agencies
in the area of international merger control. It is worth emphasizing again that our
analysis is merely positive. We are interested in determining the scope for conßict as
well as the circumstances under which such conßict is more likely to occur.
We Þnd within the context of a simple positive model of merger control that the
scope for conßict in international merger control might be rather limited. In particular,
whenever national antitrust agencies deÞne the global market as relevant, no conßict
can ever emerge. In this sense, internationalization of the economy cannot explain why
national agencies disagree. A second robust Þnding is that a positive correlation across
jurisdictions in market shares of the merging parties lowers the potential for conßict. To
the extent that market integration produces correlated market shares, a more integrated
market is subject to less conßict between antitrust agencies.
The thresholds, which describe the policy stance towards mergers, only aﬀect the
scope for conßict when the relevant market is not perceived as global for both countries.
However, whether countries agree on market deÞnition or not is irrelevant. In both
instances, either low or high thresholds reduce the scope for conßict. That is also to
say that a policy which takes eﬃciency into account explicitly - and hence allows for a
variety of thresholds around the average - is less likely to generate conßict.
Finally, we show that the diﬀerence in country size matters only when there is conßict
over the relevant market, i.e. when one country deÞnes the global market as relevant
while the other country considers the national market as relevant. In those circumstances
we Þnd that countries of unequal size have a lower probability of conßict.
Since both correlated market shares and global market deÞnitions are associated
with an open and integrated economic area, it appears that the scope for conßict in
international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high.
We therefore interpret our results to suggest that globalization should not be seen
as the source of conßict between national antitrust agencies, but should rather help
alleviate such frictions. Of course, our model assumes that national agencies follow
their mandate and protect consumer interests. This raises the suspicion that conßict in
international merger control may well be associated with the pursuit of other objectives,
like the defense of national champions.
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